Logica Universalis 9 (1):121-127 (2015)
AbstractI show that in the context of proof-theoretic semantics, Dummett’s distinction between the assertoric meaning of a sentence and its ingredient sense can be seen as a distinction between two proof-theoretic meanings of a sentence: 1.Meaning as a conclusion of an introduction rule in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof system. 2.Meaning as a premise of an introduction rule in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof system. The effect of this distinction on compositionality of proof-theoretic meaning is discussed
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References found in this work
Against the Identification of Assertoric Content with Compositional Value.Brian Rabern - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):75-96.
The Runabout Inference Ticket.Arthur Prior - 1967 - In Peter Strawson (ed.), Analysis. Oxford University Press. pp. 38-9.
Proof-Theoretic Semantics for Subsentential Phrases.Nissim Francez, Roy Dyckhoff & Gilad Ben-Avi - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (3):381-401.
Proof-Theoretic Semantics for a Natural Language Fragment.Nissim Francez & Roy Dyckhoff - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (6):447-477.
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