On a Distinction of Two Facets of Meaning and its Role in Proof-theoretic Semantics

Logica Universalis 9 (1):121-127 (2015)

Abstract

I show that in the context of proof-theoretic semantics, Dummett’s distinction between the assertoric meaning of a sentence and its ingredient sense can be seen as a distinction between two proof-theoretic meanings of a sentence: 1.Meaning as a conclusion of an introduction rule in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof system. 2.Meaning as a premise of an introduction rule in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof system. The effect of this distinction on compositionality of proof-theoretic meaning is discussed

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,722

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-03-03

Downloads
21 (#539,912)

6 months
1 (#388,319)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nissim Francez
Technion, Israel Institute of Technology

References found in this work

The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38.
The Runabout Inference Ticket.Arthur Prior - 1967 - In Peter Strawson (ed.), Analysis. Oxford University Press. pp. 38-9.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles