underpinning of the cognitive sciences. I argue, however, that it often fails to provide adequate explanations, in particular in conjunction with competence theories. This failure originates in the idealizations in competence descriptions, which either ?block? the cascade, or produce a successful cascade which fails to explain cognition
Keywords Classical  Cognitive Science  Methodology  Realism  Science
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/46.4.475
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Knowledge of Grammar as a Propositional Attitude.Jonathan Knowles - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):325 – 353.
The Uncertain Reasoner: Bayes, Logic, and Rationality.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.

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