Ontological physicalism and property pluralism: Why they are incompatible

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):349-362 (2000)

Authors
Robert Francescotti
San Diego State University
Abstract
To earn the title “ontological physicalist,” one must endorse an entailment thesis of the following sort: the physical properties that are had, together with the causal laws, determine which higher-level properties are had. I argue that if this thesis is to capture all that is essential to physicalist intuitions, the relevant set of causal laws must be restricted to purely physical laws. But then it follows that higher-level properties are physical properties. The conclusion is that one cannot consistently be an ontological physicalist while endorsing property pluralism.
Keywords Metaphysics  Ontology  Physicalism  Pluralism  Property
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00109
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References found in this work BETA

Making Sense of Emergence.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
Concepts of Supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Frank Jackson - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):614.
Precis of Philosophical NaturalismPhilosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):657.

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Citations of this work BETA

Material Through and Through.Andrew M. Bailey - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism?Robert Francescotti - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.

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