On the explanatory deficiencies of linguistic content

Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75 (1999)
Abstract
The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining their actions. I argue that the considerations motivating this view are best handled with just the ordinary ‘that’-clause contents.
Keywords Content  Explanation  Individualism  Linguistics  Metaphysics  Loar, B  externalism  twin-earth  Burge  Putnam
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004211016672
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Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks.Bryan Frances - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.

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