Philosophical Expertise

In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 297-306 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philosophical expertise consists in knowledge, but it is controversial what this knowledge consists in. I focus on three issues: the extent and nature of knowledge of philosophical truths, how this philosophical knowledge is related to philosophical progress, and skeptical challenges to philosophical knowledge.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Extensive Philosophical Agreement and Progress.Bryan Frances - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):47-57.
Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):378-410.
Authenticating Expertise.Jason Borenstein - 2002 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 16 (1):85-102.
Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Thought experiments, real experiments, and the expertise objection.Christopher Hitchcock - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):205-218.
Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.
Philosophical and Psychological Accounts of Expertise and Experts.Matt Stichter - 2015 - Humana.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 28:105-128.
The “Ethics” Expertise in Clinical Ethics Consultation.Ana S. Iltis & Lisa M. Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (4):363-368.
Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From.Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-07-06

Downloads
211 (#91,982)

6 months
32 (#101,267)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?Bryan Frances - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):325-345.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references