Plausibility, Manipulation, and Fischer and Ravizza

Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):173-192 (2010)
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Abstract

The manipulation argument poses a significant challenge for any adequate compatibilist theory of agency. The argument maintains that there is no relevant difference between actions or pro‐attitudes that are induced by nefarious neurosurgeons, God, or (and this is the important point) natural causes. Therefore, if manipulation is thought to undermine moral responsibility, then so also ought causal determinism. In this paper, I will attempt to bolster the plausibility of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's semicompatibilist theory of moral responsibility by demonstrating how their account provides a distinctive line of response to three important types of manipulation.

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