Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1803-1817 (2021)

Abstract
Modern society makes extensive use of automated algorithmic decisions, fueled by advances in artificial intelligence. However, since these systems are not perfect, questions about fairness are increasingly investigated in the literature. In particular, many authors take a Rawlsian approach to algorithmic fairness. This article aims to identify some complications with this approach: Under which circumstances can Rawls’s original position reasonably be applied to algorithmic fairness decisions? First, it is argued that there are important differences between Rawls’s original position and a parallel algorithmic fairness original position with respect to risk attitudes. Second, it is argued that the application of Rawls’s original position to algorithmic fairness faces a boundary problem in defining relevant stakeholders. Third, it is observed that the definition of the least advantaged, necessary for applying the difference principle, requires some attention in the context of algorithmic fairness. Finally, it is argued that appropriate deliberation in algorithmic fairness contexts often require more knowledge about probabilities than the Rawlsian original position allows. Provided that these complications are duly considered, the thought-experiment of the Rawlsian original position can be useful in algorithmic fairness decisions.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s13347-021-00488-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,634
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - Duckworth.
Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies.Nick Bostrom (ed.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
The Law of Peoples.John Rawls - 1993 - Critical Inquiry 20 (1):36-68.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

First- and Second-Level Bias in Automated Decision-making.Ulrik Franke - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-20.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Democratizing Algorithmic Fairness.Pak-Hang Wong - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 33 (2):225-244.
John Rawls: Reticent Socialist.William A. Edmundson - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
What's Fair About Individual Fairness?Will Fleisher - 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society.
A Moral Framework for Understanding of Fair ML Through Economic Models of Equality of Opportunity.Hoda Heidari - 2019 - Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency 1.
Justice as Fairness in a Broken World.Marcus Arvan - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 4 (2):95-126.
Rawls’s Self-Defeat: A Formal Analysis.Hun Chung - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1169-1197.
Rawlsian Affirmative Action: Compensatory Justice as Seen From the Original Position.Robert Allen - 1998 - In George Leaman (ed.), 20th World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville, VA, USA: pp. 1-8.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-11-03

Total views
21 ( #539,708 of 2,533,815 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #60,400 of 2,533,815 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes