Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism

In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2018)
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Abstract

This paper reassesses the case against Evidential Externalism, the thesis that one's evidence fails to supervene on one's non-factive mental states, focusing on two objections to Externalism due by Nicholas Silins: the armchair access argument and the supervenience argument. It also examines Silins's attempt to undermine the force of one major source of motivation for Externalism, namely that the rival Internalist picture of evidence is implicated in some central arguments for scepticism. While Silins concludes that the case against Evidential Externalism is surprisingly strong, reassessing the arguments supports the opposite conclusion; the objections to Externalism are weak, and for all Silins has shown it may well have unmatched advantages when it comes to resisting scepticism.

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Author Profiles

Giada Fratantonio
University of Glasgow
Aidan McGlynn
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Opaque Updates.Michael Cohen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):447-470.
I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted.Ofra Magidor - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):151-181.
‘This Is the Bad Case’: What Brains in Vats Can Know.Aidan McGlynn - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):183-205.

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References found in this work

Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Epistemological disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge First?Aidan McGlynn - 2014 - New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian.

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