The assimilation argument and the rollback argument

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):395-416 (2012)
Abstract
Seth Shabo has presented a new argument that attempts to codify familiar worries about indeterminism, luck, and control. His ‘Assimilation Argument’ contends that libertarians cannot distinguish overtly randomized outcomes from exercises of free will. Shabo claims that the argument possesses advantages over the Mind Argument and Rollback Argument, which also purport to establish that indeterminism is incompatible with free will. I argue first that the Assimilation Argument presents no new challenges over and above those presented by the Rollback Argument, and second that the Rollback Argument itself neither presents a deep challenge to, nor raises the cost of, accepting libertarianism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01432.x
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A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.

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