Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):395-416 (2012)

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Abstract
Seth Shabo has presented a new argument that attempts to codify familiar worries about indeterminism, luck, and control. His ‘Assimilation Argument’ contends that libertarians cannot distinguish overtly randomized outcomes from exercises of free will. Shabo claims that the argument possesses advantages over the Mind Argument and Rollback Argument, which also purport to establish that indeterminism is incompatible with free will. I argue first that the Assimilation Argument presents no new challenges over and above those presented by the Rollback Argument, and second that the Rollback Argument itself neither presents a deep challenge to, nor raises the cost of, accepting libertarianism
Keywords Libertarianism  Free Will  Moral Responsibility  Rollback Argument  Luck Argument  Agent-causation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01432.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1970 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Two‐Stage Luck Objection.Seth Shabo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):3-23.
Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.
Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism.Zac Cogley - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):121-137.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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