The divided we and multiple obligations

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43:e70 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Tomasello's account of the origins and nature of moral obligation rightly emphasises the key roles of social relations and a cooperative sense of “we.” However, we suggest that it overlooks the complexity of those social relations and the resulting prevalence of a divided “we” in moral social groups. We argue that the social identity dynamics that arise can lead to competing obligations in a single group, and this has implications for the evolution of obligation.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Essentially Shared Obligations.Gunnar Björnsson - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
Conditional Obligations.Tina Rulli - 2020 - Social Theory and Practice 46 (2):365-390.
Is the Concept of Obligation Moralized?Kenneth Einar Himma - 2018 - Law and Philosophy 37 (2):203-227.
On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself.Janis David Schaab - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):175-189.
Parental Obligation.Nellie Wieland - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (3):249-267.
Just Say ‘No’: Obligations to Voice Disagreement.Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:117-138.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-01

Downloads
7 (#1,201,127)

6 months
1 (#1,040,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?