The desire you are required to get rid of: A functionalist analysis of desire in the bhagavadgita

Philosophy East and West 56 (4):604-+ (2006)
Authors
Christopher Framarin
University of Calgary
Abstract
: Nisk?makarma is generally understood nonliterally as action done without desire of a certain sort. It is argued here that all desires are prohibited by nisk?makarma. Two objections are considered: (1) desire is a necessary condition of action, and (2) the Indian tradition as a whole accepts desire as a necessary condition of action. A distinction is drawn here between a goal and a desire, and it is argued that goals
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DOI 10.1353/pew.2006.0051
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