Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):72-92 (2019)

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Abstract
:It is often claimed that libertarianism offers an unattractive conception of free will and moral responsibility because it renders free agency inexplicable and irrational. This essay aims, first, to show that the soundness of these objections turns on more basic disagreements concerning the ideals of free agency and, second, to develop and motivate a truly libertarian conception of the ideals of free agency. The central contention of the essay is that the heart of libertarians’ ideal of free agency is the ideal of agential fundamentality.
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DOI 10.1017/s0265052519000256
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
Self-Expression: A Deep Self Theory of Moral Responsibility.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.

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