Mind 115 (460):1007-1022 (2006)

For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
Keywords statue  clay  paradox  material composition  Kit Fine  opaque context  substitutivity  objects
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzl1007
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How Much Substitutivity?Graeme Forbes - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):109–113.

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Identity Over Time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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