The Trouble with Images

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):113-115 (1978)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is immensely difficult to give a philosophically adequate account of mental imagery. Peter F.R. Haynes, pp. 709–19) objects to the standard accounts, and offers one of his own which avoids the standard difficulties. Unfortunately it in turn seems to lapse into incoherence.Haynes rejects Cartesian accounts which would make images private objects in non-physical space. He also rejects current alternative views: both Rylean or behaviourist ones; and also intentionally complex ones, which assert that the relevant terms change their meaning. He thinks that J. J. C. Smart's “topic neutral” approach may supply “the basis for a correct, intentionally simple, intuitively satisfying account of mental imagery”. But an adequate account must also be neutral, as Smart's is not, between different theories of mind. In addition to avoiding these difficulties an adequate theory has certain other desiderata; in particular Haynes places valuable emphasis on the need to explain the fact that we can sometimes mistake images for real perceptions or, more real perceptions for images.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Trouble with Images in Computational Physics.Matt Spencer - 2012 - Spontaneous Generations 6 (1):34-42.
The trouble with images.R. L. Franklin - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (March):113-115.
Why Images?Megan Delehanty - 2010 - Medicine Studies 2 (3):161-173.
Foundation of computational visualistics.Jörg R. J. Schirra - 2005 - Deutscher Universitätsverlag.
Double trouble. [REVIEW]Stephen Palmquist - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine 15:58-58.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-17

Downloads
7 (#1,407,939)

6 months
3 (#1,037,581)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references