Foundations of Science:1-23 (forthcoming)

Abstract
One of the central aims of the philosophical analysis of mathematical explanation is to determine how one can distinguish explanatory proofs from non-explanatory proofs. In this paper, I take a closer look at the current status of the debate, and what the challenges for the philosophical analysis of explanatory proofs are. In order to provide an answer to these challenges, I suggest we start from analysing the concept understanding. More precisely, I will defend four claims: understanding is a condition for explanation, unificatory understanding is a type of explanatory understanding, unificatory understanding is valuable in mathematics, and mathematical proofs can contribute to unificatory understanding. As a result, in a context where the epistemic aim is to unify mathematical results, I argue it is fruitful to make a distinction between proofs based on their explanatory value.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10699-020-09654-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,481
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Logic of Explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
Explanation and Scientific Understanding.Michael Friedman - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):5-19.
Explanatory Unification.Philip Kitcher - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):507-531.
The Epistemic Value of Understanding.Henk W. de Regt - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):585-597.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Mathematical Explanations That Are Not Proofs.Marc Lange - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1285-1302.
Explanation in Mathematical Practice.David Sandborg - 1997 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Can We Have Mathematical Understanding of Physical Phenomena?Gabriel Târziu - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1):91-109.
What Inductive Explanations Could Not Be.John Dougherty - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5473-5483.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-02-29

Total views
15 ( #672,047 of 2,446,288 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #310,412 of 2,446,288 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes