Rationality, Normativity, and Emotions: An Assessment of Max Weber’s Typology of Social Action

Klesis 48:235-267 (2020)
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Abstract

A view inherited from Max Weber states that purposive rational action, value rational action and affective action are three distinct types of social action that can compete, oppose, complement or substitute each other in social explanations. Contrary to this statement, I will defend the view that these do not constitute three different types of social actions, but that social actions always seem to concurrently involve rationality, normativity and affectivity. I show this by discussing the links between rational actions and consequentialism and non-consequentialism, and by elaborating on certain major relationships between rationality, normativity and emotions.

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Frédéric Minner
University of Geneva

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