Philosophers' Imprint 20 (15):1-19 (2020)

Authors
Ian Phillips
Johns Hopkins University
Craig French
Nottingham University
Abstract
Many contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are incapable of accounting for illusions. Various sophisticated proposals have been ventured to meet this charge. Here, we take a different approach and dispute whether the naïve realist owes any distinctive account of illusion. To this end, we begin with a simple, naïve account of veridical perception. We then examine the case that this account cannot be extended to illusions. By reconstructing an explicit version of this argument, we show that it depends critically on the contention that perceptual experience is diaphanous, or more minimally and precisely, that there can be no difference in phenomenal properties between two experiences without a difference in the scenes presented in those experiences. Finding no good reason to accept this claim, we develop and defend a simple, naïve account of both veridical perception and illusion, here dubbed Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.
Keywords Perception  Illusion  Naive Realism  Perceptual Experience  Colour Experience
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References found in this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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