Authors
Karyn L. Freedman
University of Guelph
Abstract
Akrasia is a classical Greek term that is typically translated as “incontinence,” although it is sometimes translated as “weakness of the will”. Someone who displays practical akrasia exhibits a failure of control, but not an absence of control. In the practical case, the akratic individual intentionally and voluntarily acts in a way that is contrary to what she judges she ought to do. I tuck into a large piece of cheesecake even though I know I ought not to, or I light up a cigarette although I have avowed to quit. In cases of akrasia, practical judgments go in different directions; the agent acts against her best...
Keywords epistemic akrasia  rationality  weakness of will
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DOI 10.1353/ppp.2017.0049
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