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Conclusive reasons
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22 (1971)
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Similar books and articles
Some conclusive reasons against 'conclusive reasons'.George S. Pappas & Marshall Swain - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):72 – 76.
Conclusive reasons and scepticism.William S. Boardman - 1978 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):32 – 40.
Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck.Tamar Lando - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):378-395.
A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive Reasons.Charles B. Cross - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):353-370.
Empirically conclusive reasons and scepticism.Raymond Martin - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (3):215 - 217.
Near Triviality of Conclusive Reasons.Tetsuji Iseda - 2005 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 14 (1):1-20.
Some Inconclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’.Martin Curd - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:293-302.
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Citations of this work
Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe.Mona Simion - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):203-216.
Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.
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