Distance from Safety! A Reply to Broncano‐Berrocal's “No Luck in the Distance”

Theoria 82 (4):370-373 (2016)
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Abstract

In a recent contribution to this journal, Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety conception of knowledge against my counterexamples in Freitag 2014 by adding a new clause to the safety condition. In this brief reply, I argue that Broncano-Berrocal's modification cannot be plausibly understood as a natural development of the original safety idea and that, moreover, the resulting account of knowledge can be refuted by a slight alteration of my original examples.

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Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.

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