Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?

Theoria 78 (2):115-127 (2012)
Abstract
In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts “see” does not have the sort of meaning (a purely perceptual meaning) which would sustain Turri's claims about the cases he offers (specifically, the (A) verdicts)
Keywords perception  propositional knowledge  propositional seeing  factive states
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01130.x
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?John Turri - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):197-206.

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Citations of this work BETA
Fake Barns and False Dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P.Craig French - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.
The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism.Craig French - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):86-104.

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2012-03-01

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