Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):631-47 (2016)

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Abstract
Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian ad hominen attacks. Intuitionists try to avoid that by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. That does not avoid the problem. It also limits epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those with meagre content, and the intuitionists offer no plausible explanation for how inference from such insubstantial propositions can engender substantial moral knowledge. Instead of moral knowledge, intuitionism offers the prospect of mutual name-calling between intellectually stagnant groups. I criticise and reject the principle of phenomenal conservatism, to which intuitionists sometimes appeal.
Keywords Robert Audi  culture  empirical testing  moral epistemology  ethical intuitionism  Michael Huemer  moral observation  theory laden  moral emotion  Karl Popper
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-016-9547-8
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References found in this work BETA

Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
The Realm of Rights.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Moral Perception.Robert Audi - 2013 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Falsificationism and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Danny Frederick - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (4):494-503.

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