Factors for Evaluating Presumptions and Presumptive Inferences

Argumentation 33 (2):215-240 (2019)
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Abstract

Lilian Bermejo-Luque has posed these questions:1.What is the relationship between presumption and presumptive inference? 2.What are the correctness conditions for presumptions and presumptive inferences? Cohen’s method of relevant variables, Toulmin’s model, and Rescher’s theory of plausibility suggest answers. An inference is presumptive just in case its warrant transfers presumption from its premises to its conclusion. A warrant licencing an inference from the claim that an empirical property φ holds to the claim that some other property ψ holds is backed by observation of a constant conjunction of those properties. The stronger the backing, the stronger the warrant. Warrants may be defeated by instances of φ holding in conjunction with some property χ and ψ not holding. The method of relevant variables directs us to organize such defeating properties into relevant variables. We then test the strength of a warrant by seeing how many variables fail to have a value which defeats the warrant. The more variables with no defeater, the stronger the warrant. We may construct a canonical ordering of the relevant variables by ranking them according to the plausibility of their including defeating values. We may evaluate the strength not only of empirically backed warrants, but warrants backed by institutional rules, such as a branch of law, or by a priori intuited connections between properties. An inference rule will be presumptive just in case the plausibility of its warrant being defeated is below some specified level.

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On the strength of presumptions.Petar Bodlović - 2022 - Pragmatics and Cognition 29 (1):82-110.

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