Interests and animal rights

Philosophical Quarterly 27 (108):254-259 (1977)
In his paper "rights" ("the philosophical quarterly", Volume 15, 1965, Pages 115-127), H j mccloskey maintains that only beings who can possess interests can possess rights; and he goes on to argue that animals cannot satisfy this requirement. In his paper "mccloskey on why animals cannot have rights" ("the philosophical quarterly", Volume 26, 1976, Pages 251-257), Tom regan disputes mccloskey's requirement. First, He queries whether mccloskey's "is" a requirement for the possession of rights; second, He tries to show that animals can nevertheless satisfy it. On both counts, I contend that regan's arguments do not work. I also set out a mccloskey-Like position which is not open to regan's attack upon its legitimacy. I conclude with an example designed to show why regan has failed to establish that animals have interests
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DOI 10.2307/2218784
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Moral Rights and Animals.H. J. McCloskey - 1979 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):23 – 54.
The Rights of Wild Things.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1979 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):171 – 188.

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