Interests and animal rights

Philosophical Quarterly 27 (108):254-259 (1977)

In his paper "rights" ("the philosophical quarterly", Volume 15, 1965, Pages 115-127), H j mccloskey maintains that only beings who can possess interests can possess rights; and he goes on to argue that animals cannot satisfy this requirement. In his paper "mccloskey on why animals cannot have rights" ("the philosophical quarterly", Volume 26, 1976, Pages 251-257), Tom regan disputes mccloskey's requirement. First, He queries whether mccloskey's "is" a requirement for the possession of rights; second, He tries to show that animals can nevertheless satisfy it. On both counts, I contend that regan's arguments do not work. I also set out a mccloskey-Like position which is not open to regan's attack upon its legitimacy. I conclude with an example designed to show why regan has failed to establish that animals have interests
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2218784
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,122
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Rights and Animals.H. J. McCloskey - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):23 – 54.
The Rights of Wild Things.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):171 – 188.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
327 ( #19,507 of 2,289,285 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #101,219 of 2,289,285 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature