In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. D. Ashfield’s Response [Book Review]

Acta Analytica 28 (1):127-137 (2013)

Abstract
The article responds to the objections M.D. Ashfield has raised to my recent attempt at saving epistemic contextualism from the knowability problem. First, it shows that Ashfield’s criticisms of my minimal conception of epistemic contextualism, even if correct, cannot reinstate the knowability problem. Second, it argues that these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the commitments of my minimal conception. I conclude that there is still no reason to maintain that epistemic contextualism has the knowability problem
Keywords Epistemic Contextualism  Minimal Contextualism  Knowability Problem  Factivity Problem  Scepticism
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0168-y
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Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Contextualism and the Factivity Problem.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580-602.

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