On the Particularity of Experience

Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-05-03

Downloads
199 (#104,163)

6 months
1,185 (#792)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Craig French
Nottingham University
Anil Gomes
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):885-902.
Two Conceptions of Phenomenology.Ori Beck - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1-17.
Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions.Ori Beck - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1175-1190.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.

View all 32 references / Add more references