Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38 (2010)

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Abstract
Determinism seems incompatible with free will. However, even indeterminism seems incompatible with free will, since it seems to make free actions random. Popper contends that free agents are not bound by physical laws, even indeterministic ones, and that undetermined actions are not random if they are influenced by abstract entities. I argue that Popper could strengthen his account by drawing upon his theories of propensities and of limited rationality; but that even then his account would not fully explain why free actions are not random. I offer a solution to this problem which draws on Hornsby’s analysis of action. I then borrow an idea of Kant about self-consciousness to distinguish free agents from sub-human animals. I make a brief evaluation of Popper ’s contribution.
Keywords free will  free decision  determinism  Hornsby  indeterminism  intentional action  Kane  Popper  propensity  self-consciousness
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DOI 10.12697/spe.2010.3.1.02
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References found in this work BETA

The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Direction of Time.Hans Reichenbach - 1956 - Dover Publications.
Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.

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Citations of this work BETA

Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (1):61-75.
A Puzzle About Natural Laws and the Existence of God.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):269-283.
Free Will and Probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.

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