Searle’s Contradictory Theory of Social Reality


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Abstract
John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance that is not analysable into individual acceptance. I point out three self-contradictions in Searle’s exposition.
Keywords collective acceptance  contradiction  deontic powers  John Searle  status function  social facts  institutions  social construction  collective intentionality  private institution
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