Sloppy Models, Renormalization Group Realism, and the Success of Science

Erkenntnis:1-29 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The “sloppy models” program originated in systems biology, but has seen applications across a range of fields. Sloppy models are dependent on a large number of parameters, but highly insensitive to the vast majority of parameter combinations. Sloppy models proponents claim that the program may explain the success of science. I argue that the sloppy models program can at best provide a very partial explanation. Drawing a parallel with renormalization group realism, I argue that it would only give us grounds for a minimal kind of scientific realism. Nonetheless, the program can offer certain epistemic virtues.

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David Freeborn
Northeastern University

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References found in this work

A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 2001 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 211.
Model Evaluation: An Adequacy-for-Purpose View.Wendy S. Parker - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (3):457-477.

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