Argumentation 19 (3):331-346 (2005)
AbstractRelevance of premises to conclusion can be explicated through Toulmin’s notion of warrant, understood as an inference rule, albeit not necessarily formal. A normative notion of relevance requires the warrant to be reliable. To determine reliability, we propose a fourfold classification of warrants into a priori, empirical, institutional, and evaluative, with further subdivisions possible. This classification has its ancestry in classical rhetoric and recent epistemology. Distinctive to each type of warrant is the mode by which such connections are intuitively discovered and the grounds on which we ultimately justify them. The classification of warrants is thus epistemic. We illustrate the difference by contrasting empirical physical with institutional intuition, and argue for the advantages of this approach over Toulmin’s conception of field dependence.
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References found in this work
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Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.William P. Alston - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.
Citations of this work
Cochrane Review as a “Warranting Device” for Reasoning About Health.Sally Jackson & Jodi Schneider - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):241-272.
Solving a Murder Case by Asking Critical Questions: An Approach to Fact-Finding in Terms of Argumentation and Story Schemes. [REVIEW]Floris Bex & Bart Verheij - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (3):325-353.
The Role of Evidence in Chronic Care Decision-Making.Fabrizio Macagno & Sarah Bigi - 2021 - Topoi 40 (2):343-358.
Toulmin's Rhetorical Logic: What's the Warrant for Warrants?William Keith & David Beard - 2008 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 41 (1):22-50.
Some Reflections on the Informal Logic Initiative.Ralph H. Johnson - 2009 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 16 (29).
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