Unmotivated Intentional Action

Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):21-30 (2010)

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Abstract
In opposition to the tenet of contemporary action theory that an intentional action must be done for a reason, I argue that some intentional actions are unmotivated. I provide examples of arbitrary and habitual actions that are done for no reason at all. I consider and rebut an objection to the examples of unmotivated habitual action. I explain how my contention differs from recent challenges to the tenet by Hursthouse, Stocker and Pollard.
Keywords arbitrary action  desire  habitual action  intentional action  reason  value  Hursthouse  Stocker  Pollard  Michael Smith
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