Unmotivated Intentional Action

Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):21-30 (2010)
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In opposition to the tenet of contemporary action theory that an intentional action must be done for a reason, I argue that some intentional actions are unmotivated. I provide examples of arbitrary and habitual actions that are done for no reason at all. I consider and rebut an objection to the examples of unmotivated habitual action. I explain how my contention differs from recent challenges to the tenet by Hursthouse, Stocker and Pollard.



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Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.

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