Why the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is not contingently true either

Synthese 78 (2):141 - 166 (1989)
Faced with strong arguments to the effect that Leibniz''sPrinciple of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is not a necessary truth, many supporters of the Principle have staged a strategic retreat to the claim that it is contingently true in this, the actual, world. The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of the various forms of PII in both classical and quantum physics, and it is concluded that this latter view is at best doubtful, at worst, simply wrong.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00869370
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
The Direction of Time.Hans Reichenbach - 1956 - Dover Publications.

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Withering Away, Weakly.F. A. Muller - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):223 - 233.
The Relative Facts Interpretation and Everett's Note Added in Proof.Christina Conroy - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (2):112-120.
Schrödinger Logics.C. A. da Costa Newton & Krause Décio - 1994 - Studia Logica 53 (4):533-550.

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