Philosophy of Science 75 (1):93-105 (2008)

Authors
Mathias Frisch
Universität Hannover
Abstract
In Frisch 2004 and 2005 I showed that the standard ways of modeling particle-field interactions in classical electrodynamics, which exclude the interactions of a particle with its own field, results in a formal inconsistency, and I argued that attempts to include the self-field lead to numerous conceptual problems. In this paper I respond to criticism of my account in Belot 2007 and Muller 2007. I concede that this inconsistency in itself is less telling than I suggested earlier but argue that existing solutions to the theory's foundational problems do not support the kind of traditional philosophical conception of scientific theorizing defended by Muller and Belot. *Received January 2007; revised October 2007. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, Skinner Building, College Park, MD 20742; e-mail: mfrisch@umd.edu.
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DOI 10.1086/587824
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References found in this work BETA

Is Classical Electrodynamics an Inconsistent Theory?Gordon Belot - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):263-282.
Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics?F. A. Muller - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):253-277.
Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics.Mathias Frisch - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):525-549.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conceptual Fragmentation and the Rise of Eliminativism.Henry Taylor & Peter Vickers - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):17-40.
‘The Most Sacred Tenet’&Quest; Causal Reasoning in Physics: Article.Mathias Frisch - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):459-474.
Causality and Dispersion: A Reply to John Norton.Mathias Frisch - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):487 - 495.
Scientific Theory Eliminativism.Peter Vickers - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):111-126.
Is Science Inconsistent?Otávio Bueno & Peter Vickers - 2014 - Synthese 191 (13):2887-2889.

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