Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing

Oxford University Press (2007)

Authors
Miranda Fricker
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Ethics  Justice (Philosophy  Fairness
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Reprint years 2009
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Call number BD176.F75 2007
ISBN(s) 9780198237907   0198237901   9780199570522
DOI 10.1093/analys/anp028
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Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony

This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, ... see more

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