Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing

New York: Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.

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Chapters

Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony

This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, ... see more

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Miranda Fricker
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.
On statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness.Brian Hedden - 2021 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 49 (2):209-231.
Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.

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