Fernández on Transparency: Is the Bypass Procedure Compatible with Changes in Belief-Formation?

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):25-40 (2020)
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Abstract

According to Fernández, we self-attribute beliefs on the basis of their grounds, “bypassing” the beliefs to be attributed. My paper argues that this procedure runs into normative and metaphysical problems if certain changes in the subject’s ways of forming beliefs occur. If the change is accidental, the problem is normative: self-attributing the resulting belief by way of Bypass cannot be justified. The metaphysical problem is that it is unclear how the procedure can reflect any change in belief-formation at all, given that it is not supposed to take into account anything but the (changing) grounds of the beliefs, not the beliefs themselves.

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Martin Francisco Fricke
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.
Introspection.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.

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