Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139 (2018)

Authors
Daniel J. Miller
West Virginia University
Kyle G. Fritz
University of Mississippi
Abstract
Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and thereby a rejection of the equality of persons, which we argue grounds the standing to blame others.
Keywords Hypocrisy  Blame  Standing  Ethics of Blame
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/papq.12104
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Blame and Moral Protest.Angela Smith - 2013 - In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Walk and the Talk.Daniela Dover - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):387-422.
Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing.Cristina Roadevin - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (1-2):137-152.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

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