In Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 221-232 (2008)

Authors
Martin Francisco Fricke
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
Abstract
Dieter Henrich’s reconstruction of the transcendental deduction in "Identität und Objektivität" has been criticised (probably unfairly) by Guyer and others for assuming that we have a priori Cartesian certainty about our own continuing existence through time. In his later article "The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction", Henrich addresses this criticism and proposes a new, again entirely original argument for a reconstruction. I attempt to elucidate this argument with reference to Evans’s theory of the Generality Constraint and a remark of Strawson’s in Individuals. Its logical form of a sentence-operator requires that the "I think" be capable of accompanying every thought that we can form. Henrich seems to rely on this point, claiming in addition that we must be aware of this property of the "I think". I object that we cannot assume everyone to be capable of doing the philosophy of her own situation.
Keywords Self-consciousness  Gareth Evans  Peter Strawson
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