Noûs 53 (2):296-315 (2019)

Authors
Jane Friedman
New York University
Abstract
In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an inquiry or question settled.
Keywords inquiry  belief  credence  norms of inquiry  settling inquiry
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12222
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References found in this work BETA

Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180-187.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Belief is Weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Questions in Action.Daniel Hoek - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (3):113-143.
Thinking and Being Sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-27.
Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.

View all 60 citations / Add more citations

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