Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583 (2017)
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Abstract

In this paper I revisit Gilbert Harman's arguments for a "clutter avoidance" norm. The norm -- which says that we ought to avoid cluttering our minds with trivialities -- is widely endorsed. I argue that it has some fairly dramatic consequences for normative epistemology.

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Jane Friedman
New York University

Citations of this work

The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.
Inquiry and the epistemic.David Thorstad - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2913-2928.
Norms of Inquiry.Eliran Haziza - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (12):e12952.

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References found in this work

Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.
The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.

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