Authors
Martin Francisco Fricke
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
Abstract
Four different notions of freedom can be distinguished in Kant's philosophy: logical freedom, practical freedom, transcendental freedom and freedom of choice ("Willkür"). The most important of these is transcendental freedom. Kant's argument for its existence depend on the claim that, necessarily, the categorical imperative is the highest principle of reason. My paper examines how this claim can be made plausible.
Keywords Freedom  Categorical imperative  Practical reason  Fact of reason  Acting under the idea of freedom
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