In Patricia King Dávalos, Juan Carlos González González & Eduardo González de Luna (eds.), Ciencias cognitivas y filosofía. Entre la cooperación y la integración. México, D.F.: Universidad Autónoma de Queretaro and Miguel Ángel Porrúa. pp. 99-115 (2014)

Martin Francisco Fricke
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
In the second Meditation, Descartes argues that, because he thinks, he must exist. What are his reasons for accepting the premise of this argument, namely that he thinks? Some commentators suggest that Descartes has a ‘logic’ argument for his premise: It is impossible to be deceived in thinking that one thinks, because being deceived is a species of thinking. In this paper, I argue that this ‘logic’ argument cannot contribute to the first certainty that supposedly stops the Cartesian doubt. Rather, this certainty must be based on another type of access to our own minds, possibly a faculty of introspection. Applying this result to contemporary constitutive theories of self-knowledge (Wright), I show that these cannot be part of what justifies the ascription of particular mental states to a subject. En la segunda de sus "Meditaciones metafísicas", Descartes argumenta que, porque piensa, debe existir. ¿Cuáles son sus razones para aceptar la premisa de este argumento, a saber el que piensa? Algunos comentaristas sugieren que Descartes tiene un argumento 'lógico' para su premisa: No es posible ser engañado en creer que uno piensa, porque el ser engañado también es una especie de pensamiento. En mi ponencia arguyo que este argumento 'lógico' no puede contribuir a la certeza que supuestamente para la duda cartesiana. Más bien, esta certeza debe fundarse en otro tipo de acceso, talvez de forma introspectiva, que tenemos a nuestra propia mente. Aplicando este resultado a teorías contemporáneas constitutivas del autoconocimiento (Wright), muestro que éstas no pueden contribuir a la justificación de la adscripción de estados mentales particulares.
Keywords Self-Knowledge  Self-Verification  Cogito  Cartesian doubt  Descartes  Sydney Shoemaker  Crispin Wright  Constitutive accounts of self-knowledge  Bernard Williams  Tom Stoneham
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References found in this work BETA

Introspection.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.
First-Person Access.Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:187-214.
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry.Margaret D. Wilson - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (8):431-435.
On First-Person Authority.Jane Heal - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19.

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