Necessitarianism and teleology in Aristotle's biology

Biology and Philosophy 1 (3):355-365 (1986)
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Abstract

In Aristotle's biological works, there is an apparent conflict between passages which seem to insist that only hypothetical necessity (anagk ex hypotheses) operates in the sublunary world, and passages in which some biological phenomena are explained as simply (hapls) necessary. Parallel to this textual problem lies the claim that explanations in terms of simple necessity render teleological explanations (in some of which Aristotle puts hypothetical necessity to use) superfluous. I argue that the textual conflict is only apparent, and that Aristotle's notion of coincidental sameness allows him to avoid the superfluity problem.

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Citations of this work

Causes, proximate and ultimate.Richard C. Francis - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):401-415.
Aristotle on Self-Change in Plants.Daniel Coren - 2019 - Rhizomata 7 (1):33-62.

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References found in this work

The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation.Jonathan Barnes - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (4):493-494.
Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics.W. D. Ross - 1949 - Philosophy 25 (95):380-382.
Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics.W. D. Ross - 1953 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (12):374-375.
Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality.Allan Gotthelf - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 30 (2):226 - 254.

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