Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (1):1-31 (2021)
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Abstract |
Robert Stalnaker recently proposed a simple theory of propositions using the notion of a set of propositions being consistent, and conjectured that this theory is equivalent to the claim that propositions form a complete atomic Boolean algebra. This paper clarifies and confirms this conjecture. Stalnaker also noted that some of the principles of his theory may be given up, depending on the intended notion of proposition. This paper therefore also investigates weakened constraints on consistency and the corresponding classes of Boolean algebras.
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DOI | 10.1007/s10992-020-09557-6 |
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Introduction to Lattices and Order.B. A. Davey & H. A. Priestly - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
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