In Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press (2011)

Authors
Daniel Friedrich
Humboldt-University, Berlin
Nicholas Southwood
Australian National University
Abstract
In this article we develop and defend what we call the “Trust View” of promissory obligation, according to which making a promise involves inviting another individual to trust one to do something. In inviting her trust, and having the invitation accepted (or at least not rejected), one incurs an obligation to her not to betray the trust that one has invited. The distinctive wrong involved in breaking a promise is a matter of violating this obligation. We begin by explicating the core notion of “inviting someone to trust one to do something”, suggesting that it involves signaling to the other individual one's recognition of the importance the relevant action has for her, and one’s willingness to license her to have faith or optimism in one's character with regard to the performance of that action. We then turn to a defense of the Trust View, arguing that it has considerable appeal in its own right, that it is distinct from and superior to three similar accounts (T.M. Scanlon's Assurance View, Judith Jarvis Thomson's Reliance View and David Owens' Authority View), and that several objections to it can be answered.
Keywords promises  obligation  trust  Trust View  assurance  Scanlon  reliance  Thomson  authority  Owens
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Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Matters of Trust as Matters of Attachment Security.Andrew Kirton - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):583-602.
Promises and the Backward Reach of Uptake.Hallie Liberto - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):15-26.

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