Problems with intellectualism

Philosophical Studies 165 (3):879-891 (2013)
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Abstract

In his most recent book, Stanley (2011b) defends his Intellectualist account of knowledge how. In Know How, Stanley produces the details of a propositionalist theory of intelligent action and also responds to several objections that have been forwarded to this account in the last decade. In this paper, I will focus specifically on one claim that Stanley makes in chapter one of his book: I will focus on Stanley’s claim that automatic mechanisms can be used by the intellectualist in order to terminate Ryle’s regress. I will argue that this proposed solution to the regress, regardless of how propositions are individuated, cannot provide an adequate intellectualist account of skillful action. I should note that the solution to Ryle’s regress is central to the intellectualist agenda. If Stanley fails to stop the regress or stops the regress by appealing to nonpropositional knowledge, then his intellectualist project fails.

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Ellen Fridland
King's College London

Citations of this work

Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

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References found in this work

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.

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