Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief

Abstract
There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather than belief, we can see why the Straightforward Reduction is bound to fail. I argue that, in general, suspending about p is not just a matter of having some specified standard credence for p, and in the end I suggest some ways to extend the arguments that will put pressure on other credence-theoretic accounts of belief and suspension of judgment as well.
Keywords Belief  Degrees of Belief  Credences  Suspended Judgment  agnosticism  Lockean Thesis
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Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 2:1-27.

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