Responding to Simkulet’s objections to the two tragedies argument

Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (3):223-224 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The two tragedies argument has been raised as a response to the argument against abortion from spontaneous abortion. According to this argument against the antiabortion position, miscarriages should be of great concern for proponents of this position since they result in a greater amount of deaths of human beings than induced abortions do. According to critics of AAP, this fact undermines its plausibility, since proponents of the AAP either must try to prevent miscarriages to the same extent as they try to prevent abortions or abandon their opposition to at least some abortions—which are not acceptable options for proponents of APP. The claim of 2TA is that one can differentiate between induced abortion and miscarriages due to the fact that the former involves the act of killing of another human being. This fact adds a tragedy to the tragedy that both abortions and miscarriages result in – the death of a human being – and contributes to justifying the choice of proponents of AAP to prioritise the prevention of abortions rather than miscarriages. In this response, I defend 2TA against criticism that claims that this argument is: inconsistent with the AAP and trivialises the death of the fetus. My claim is that the first line of criticism rests on a misunderstanding of the premises of 2TA while the second line of criticism rests on a disanalogous thought experiment. I therefore conclude that these objections fail.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Two tragedies argument.William Simkulet - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (5):304-308.
Two Tragedies Argument: Two Mistakes.William Simkulet - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (8):562-564.
Prenatal diagnosis, personal identity, and disability.James Lindemann Nelson - 2000 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (3):213-228.
A critique of “the best secular argument against abortion”.C. Strong - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (10):727-731.
Killing, Letting Die, and the Morality of Abortion.Anton Tupa - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):1-26.
Killing, letting die, and the morality of abortion.Anton Tupa - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):1-26.
Cursed lamp: the problem of spontaneous abortion.William Simkulet - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (11):784-791.
Personhood, Potentiality, and Abortion.Tom L. Huffman - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Missouri - Columbia
Testing, Terminating, and Discriminating.James Lindemann Nelson - 2007 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16 (4):462.
Trump's Abortion‐Promoting Aid Policy.Stephen R. Latham - 2017 - Hastings Center Report 47 (4):7-8.
Abortion, potential, and value.Reginald Williams - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (2):169-186.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-11-08

Downloads
10 (#1,160,791)

6 months
6 (#522,885)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

The Two tragedies argument.William Simkulet - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (5):304-308.
Two Tragedies Argument: Two Mistakes.William Simkulet - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (8):562-564.

Add more references