Suspended judgment

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181 (2013)
Abstract
Abstract   In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should be thought of as an attitude or not. In this paper I argue that suspended judgment is (or at least involves) a genuine attitude. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-17 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y Authors Jane Friedman, St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3UJ UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
Keywords Withholding Belief  Agnosticism  Doxastic Attitudes
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y
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References found in this work BETA
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements.Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.
Understanding Belief Reports.David M. Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.

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Citations of this work BETA
Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):1-23.
Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.
Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.

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