Philosophical Studies 165 (1):213-220 (2013)

Authors
David Friedell
Union College
Abstract
Nathan Salmon appeals to his theory of mythical objects as part of an attempt to solve Geach’s Hob–Nob puzzle. In this paper I argue that, even if Salmon’s theory of mythical objects is correct, his attempt to solve the puzzle is unsuccessful. I also refute an original variant of his proposal. The discussion indicates that it is difficult (if not impossible) to devise a genuine solution to the puzzle that relies on mythical objects
Keywords Hob–Nob puzzle  Geach  Salmon  Mythical objects  Intentional identity
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9924-5
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References found in this work BETA

Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
Intentional Identity.P. T. Geach - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):627-632.
A New Puzzle About Intentional Identity.Walter Edelberg - 1986 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (1):1 - 25.

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Citations of this work BETA

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names.Manuel García‐Carpintero - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):3-34.
Intentional Identity and Descriptions.William Lanier - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):289-302.

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