'The Most Sacred Tenet'? Causal Reasoning in Physics

According to a view widely held among philosophers of science, the notion of cause has no legitimate role to play in mature theories of physics. In this paper I investigate the role of what physicists themselves identify as causal principles in the derivation of dispersion relations. I argue that this case study constitutes a counterexample to the popular view and that causal principles can function as genuine factual constraints. IntroductionCausality and Dispersion RelationsNorton's SkepticismConclusion
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axp029
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References found in this work BETA
Mathias Frisch (2005). Mechanisms, Principles, and Lorentz's Cautious Realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 36 (4):659-679.
Mathias Frisch (2006). A Tale of Two Arrows. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 37 (3):542-558.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Norton (2009). Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in Physics? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):475-486.
Mathias Frisch (2012). No Place for Causes? Causal Skepticism in Physics. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):313-336.
Mathias Frisch (2009). Causality and Dispersion: A Reply to John Norton. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):487 - 495.

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